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CHOOSING CORPORATIONS OVER CONSUMERS: THE
FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT OF 2017 AND THE CFPB
Christopher L. Peterson *

I. INTRODUCTION
The track record of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) is a
continuing focal point in national political debates. Critics of the agency have argued
that the Bureau lacks accountability and has been too aggressive in its rulemaking,
supervisory, and enforcement programs. Defenders of the agency argue that the
Bureau’s work benefits millions of Americans while preserving access to credit and that
the agency is a positive example of government leadership. In the first year of the
Trump administration, this national conversation has coalesced around H.R. 10, the
proposed Financial Choice Act of 2017 (“Choice Act”), 1 sponsored by House Financial
Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling and supported by President Donald J.
Trump. The Choice Act substantially amends or repeals many of the reforms adopted
in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2 (“Dodd-Frank
Act”) after the financial collapse of 2008 and ensuing Great Recession. While the
proposed Choice Act addresses a variety of banking and financial industry issues, Title
VII of the bill focuses on the CFPB. The proposed legislation would rename the CFPB
the “Consumer Law Enforcement Agency” and dramatically curtail the agency’s legal
authorities in a variety of ways. The Choice Act would, for example: eliminate the
CFPB’s supervisory authority, 3 repeal the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of “unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices” in consumer finance, 4 and eliminate the CFPB’s
independent source of funding. 5
To inform discussion of the Financial Choice Act in particular and consumer
financial policy making more generally, there is an ongoing need for descriptive
empirical analysis of the CFPB’s law enforcement track record. This article presents an
analysis classifying all of the CFPB’s publicly announced enforcement actions from the
agency’s inception through the end of the 2016 calendar year. Moreover, this article also
analyzes how the Financial Choice Act would have affected these CFPB enforcement
actions if it had been controlling law in recent years. Thus, this study asks a hypothetical
question: If the Choice Act were the law of the United States from 2012 to 2016, how
would the CFPB’s enforcement track record have changed? Answers to this question
John J. Flynn Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law.
This Article draws on remarks given and helpful feedback received at the 2017 Fisher
Memorial Program of the American Bar Association Business Law Section’s Consumer
Financial Services Committee. This research was made possible, in part, through
generous support from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence at
the University of Utah. Michael Harmond provided valuable research assistance.
1 See Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017).
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15,
22, 31, and 42 U.S.C.) (hereinafter the “Dodd-Frank Act”).
3 H.R. 10, § 727.
4 Id. at § 711(a).
5 Id. at § 713.
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may assist the U.S. Senate in its deliberations over whether to follow the lead of
Representative Hensarling and President Trump. More generally, this study can help
inform policy makers, practicing attorneys, scholars, the press, and students of
consumer finance on what the future may hold if Congress adopts the Financial Choice
Act. This study also holds a mirror to the CFPB itself, illustrating the political resistance
that has emerged to the Bureau’s law enforcement work.
Part II of this article briefly summarizes the CFPB’s supervisory, fair lending, and
enforcement authorities under the Dodd-Frank Act and then reviews the Choice Act’s
proposed changes to this authority. Part III explains the study’s methodology, Part IV
reports and analyzes results, and Part V provides a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND: PROPOSED CHANGES TO CFPB UNDER THE
FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT OF 2017
In 2008 the American banking industry collapsed causing 11 trillion dollars in
wealth to vanish and leaving 21 million Americans without work. 6 Over 9 million
homes were lost to foreclosure or short sales. 7 The Great Recession caused profound
health and welfare consequences hurting millions of Americans in all fifty states. Illadvised consumer finance led to greater homelessness, hunger, disease, and suicide. 8
Congress responded to this national crisis with the Dodd-Frank Act which, among
other reforms, established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 9 Structurally, the
CFPB is an independent agency housed within the Federal Reserve Board. Instead of
funding the CFPB through the congressional appropriations process, the Dodd-Frank
Act provided that the Fed must, at the CFPB’s request, transfer to the CFPB an
inflation-adjusted sum equal to 12% of the Federal Reserve’s 2009 annual operating
expenses. 10 The Fed gathers its own funding through its operations which include
collecting interest on U.S. Treasury bonds and foreign currency investments held by the
system through its open market operations, fees received for services provided, such as
operation of the Automated Clearinghouse (“ACH”) system, and interest on loans
made to banks through the “discount window.” 11 Congress tasked the CFPB with
protecting Americans from harmful consumer financial practices. To fulfill this mission,

U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xv (2011).
Laura Kusisto, Many Who Lost Homes to Foreclosure in Last Decade Won’t Return—
NAR, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 20, 2015, 12:50 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/many-who-lost-homes-to-foreclosure-in-last-decadewont-return-nar-1429548640.
8 See Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement:
An Empirical Review, 90 TULANE L. REV. 1057, 1059-60 (2016) (hereinafter CFPB
Empirical Review) (collecting empirical research).
9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, tit. X (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481 et seq.). Congress
entitled Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act which establishes the CFPB, the Consumer
Financial Protection Act. 12 U.SC. § 5491(a).
10 Id. at § 5497(a)(1)–(2).
11 Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Frequently Asked Questions: What does it
Mean that the Federal Reserve is “independent” within the government”?, (March 1, 2017),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12799.htm.
6
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Congress authorized the Bureau “to administer, enforce, and otherwise implement the
provisions of Federal consumer financial law.” 12
Organizationally, Congress authorized the Bureau to establish a variety of offices
and legal authorities within the CFPB. First, the CFPB established a consumer response
office to respond to consumer complaints and inquiries regarding financial services
businesses. 13 The CFPB’s Consumer Response office maintains a web-based and
telephone intake portal that handles over some quarter-million inquiries in over 180
languages each year. 14 The Dodd-Frank Act required the creation of several consumer
education and empowerment offices within the CFPB. These offices include: a financial
education office, 15 an office for providing information, guidance, and technical
assistance on providing financial services to traditionally underserved communities, 16
an office focused on the financial protection of older Americans, 17 the office of a
private student lending ombudsman, 18 and an office of military service member
affairs. 19 The CFPB also has an Office of Regulations which is responsible for
exercising the Bureau’s rulemaking authority under consumer financial laws. Consumer
financial laws are defined to include Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act itself, as well as a
list of enumerated consumer financial protection law that include the Truth in Lending
Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and others. 20
12 U.S.C. § 5512(a).
See id. at § 5534 (establishing consumer complaint response authorities and
responsibilities).
14 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU:
FISCAL YEAR 2016, 23 (November 15, 2016).
15 See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(d).
16 Id. at § 5493(b)(2).
17 Id. at § 5493(g).
18 Id. at § 5535.
19 Id. at § 5493(e).
20 Id. § 5511. The enumerated consumer laws include: The Alternative Mortgage
Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Public L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1545 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 39); The Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240,
90 Stat. 257 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667–1667f); The Electronic Fund
Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 92 Stat. 3728 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch.
41, subch. 6); The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 88 Stat. 1521
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. 4); The Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1511 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. 1, pt. D);
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. 3) (excluding §§ 615(e), 628, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(e), 1681w);
The Home Owners Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-216, 112 Stat. 897
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 49); The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub.
L. No. 90-321, 91 Stat. 874 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. 5); Federal
Deposit Insurance Act § 43(b)-(f), 64 Stat. 873, (codified as amended 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1831t(c)–(f)); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 502-09, 113 Stat.
1338, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6802-6809) (excluding § 505 as it applies to
§ 501(b)); The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat.
1125 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 29); The Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. ch. 41); The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 27); The
12
13
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Borrowing from the much older Federal Trade Commission Act, Congress also gave
the CFPB enforcement and rulemaking authority to identify and stop any “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices” as well as adding a new category of “abusive” acts or
practices. 21 While the prohibition of abusive financial acts or practices was
controversial, as an empirical matter, the CFPB’s law enforcement staff have
overwhelmingly focused on identifying and stopping deceptive consumer financial
practices that are likely to mislead reasonable consumers about a material aspect of the
service. 22
The CFPB’s law enforcement responsibilities are implemented through the
Bureau’s Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending Division (SEFL). The Bureau
supervises large banks and credit Unions with over $10 billion in assets, as well as other
supervised non-bank consumer finance business specified by Congress or Bureau
regulations. 23 Supervised consumer finance companies include mortgage originators,
brokers, servicers, and foreclosure assistance providers; private student loan originators
and student loan servicers; 24 and payday lenders; 25 as well as large consumer reporting
agencies, 26 debt collection businesses, 27 international remittance providers, 28 and
automobile finance companies. 29 CFPB supervisory staff conducts risk-based,
confidential examinations that audit supervised business to ensure compliance with
consumer financial protection laws. Several hundred CFPB examiners regularly travel
throughout the country visiting consumer financial businesses to conduct exams on
sight. 30 The Bureau’s supervisory staff publishes an examination manual to assist
S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2810 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 51);The Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat.
146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. 1); The Truth in Savings Act, Pub.
L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2334 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 44); Omnibus
Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 626, 123 Stat. 524, 678-79 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1638); and The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, Pub.
L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 42). Also, Congress
subsequently gave the CFPB enforcement authority under the Military Lending Act.
Pub. L. No. 109-34, 120 Stat. 2266 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987, 15 U.S.C.
§1607). However, the Department of Defense retains rulemaking authority for this
statute. Id. § 987(h).
21 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536.
22 Peterson, CFPB Empirical Review, supra note 8, at 1093 (finding that in CFPB
enforcement cases through 2015 over 90% of all consumer relief was awarded in
cases in which the CFPB uncovered evidence that defendants illegally deceived
customers).
23 Id. at §§ 5514, 5515.
24 Id. § 1090.106.
25 Id. at § 5514(a).
26 12 C.F.R. § 1090.104.
27 Id. § 1090.105.
28 Id. § 1090.107.
29 Id. § 1090.108.
30 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND
EXAMINATION MANUAL, at Overview 10-13 (March 2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_s
upervision-and-examination-manual.pdf (for an overview of the CFPB’s examination
process).
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companies in preparing for exams, and regular Supervisory Highlights reports sharing
public results of the examiners’ work. 31
Congress also created the CFPB’s Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity,
which is housed within the Bureau’s SEFL division. 32 This office is responsible for
providing oversight and enforcement of consumer financial laws that ensure equitable
and nondiscriminatory access to credit including in particular the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act. 33
The Bureau enforces other consumer financial laws through an Office of
Enforcement which investigates and pursues enforcement actions against businesses
and individuals governed by consumer financial laws. The Bureau has enforcement
jurisdiction over any covered person or service provider to a covered person, except
for small banks and credit unions, automobile dealers that do not routinely engage in
“buy-here, pay-here” financing, and a short list of other specifically excluded
businesses. 34 Congress authorized the Bureau to enforce federal consumer financial
laws either through administrative enforcement procedures or through its own
authority to litigate in federal court. 35 CFPB administrative enforcement actions are
conducted under a CFPB regulation that largely mirrors other administrative
enforcement agencies, with trials before an administrative law judge and decisions
reviewable on appeal to the Bureau’s Director. 36 Congress also authorized the Bureau
to bring enforcement actions in Federal court independent of the Department of
Justice. 37 In both administrative proceedings and civil litigation, the CFPB is entitled to
seek any appropriate legal or equitable relief including restitution, disgorgement, and
civil money penalties. 38
The proposed Financial Choice Act of 2017 39 would substantially revise and repeal
much of the Dodd-Frank Act. Among many changes, the Choice Act would repeal
Dodd-Frank’s orderly liquidation authority provisions and eliminate the stress testing
and emergency planning requirements for many of the largest financial institutions.
With respect to the CFPB, the Choice Act would eliminate or restrict many of the
Bureau’s powers, offices, and authorities. Initially, the Choice Act appears to embrace
and prioritize the CFPB’s law enforcement mission by renaming the CFPB the
31 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND
EXAMINATION MANUAL, (March 2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_s
upervision-and-examination-manual.pdf; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
Supervisory Highlights, Issue 15, Spring 2017.
32 12 U.S.C. § 5493(c).
33 Id. at §5493(c)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
34 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515(a), (c); § 5516(a), (d). Unless they are acting as a service
provider to a covered person, other businesses explicitly excluded from CFPB
enforcement authority include nonfinancial retailers of goods or services, real estate
brokers, manufactured home retailers, accountants or tax preparers, and, in some
circumstances, attorneys. Id. § 5517. But See CFPB v. Fredrick J. Hanna & Assocs., 114
F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1362–70 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (holding debt collection lawsuit mill subject
to CFPB jurisdiction under the FDCPA and the Dodd-Frank Act).
35 12 U.S.C. §§ 5563, 5564.
36 12 C.F.R. pt. 1081.
37 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a) (2012).
38 Id. § 5565(a)(2).
39 Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017).
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Consumer Law Enforcement Agency (“CLEA”). 40 The bill would remove the agency’s
independent source of funding, subjecting it to annual congressional appropriations and
potential future budget cuts. 41 The bill would also facilitate changes to sub-units within
the CFPB by allowing the director of the new CLEA to dissolve and eliminate the
various consumer education and empowerment offices focused on particular vulnerable
groups, including the Office of Service Member Affairs, the National Student Lending
Ombudsman’s office, and the Office of Older Americans. The bill also subjects CFPB
employees to the federal government’s general compensation schedule which would
have the effect of imposing significant pay cuts on existing and future staff 90 days after
the Act becomes law. 42
The Choice Act also eliminates the CFPB’s research, market monitoring, and
publishing authorities. 43 The bill would prohibit the new agency from making
consumers’ complaint narratives public. 44 And the bill creates a new restriction on using
private information about consumers stating that “[t]he Agency may not request,
obtain, access, collect, use, retain, or disclose any nonpublic personal information about
a consumer” without explicit permission from each consumer. 45 Unlike private
companies, the Federal government does not generally enter into contracts with
consumers making the logistics of obtaining permission to gather market data
potentially insurmountable. Simultaneously, Title VII of the Choice Act provides no
restrictions on the ability of banks or other financial service providers to collect and
share data about the public.
Ironically, while limiting the Bureau’s ability to gather useful market data the
Choice Act simultaneously creates a host of new obligations to conduct empirical
studies. the legislation would create a new Office of Economic Analysis (“OEA”)
within the agency tasked with engaging in cost-benefit analysis of public action. 46 The
Choice Act would require a cost-benefit analysis, and require the Director to consider
that analysis, prior to adopting any rule. 47 The bill would also impose upon the new
OEA a constantly revolving docket of periodically scheduled retrospective cost-benefit
reviews and public reports on every existing regulation overseen by the agency. 48
Additionally, the bill requires the Director to issue advisory opinions on request. 49 But
ironically, the legislation would also instruct courts to ignore these advisory opinions
by reversing the current law that requires courts to grant deference to the CFPB’s
interpretation of the laws and regulations it enforces. 50 With nearly twenty different
enumerated consumer financial laws and their related regulations falling within the
jurisdiction of the agency, these retrospective analyses and advisory opinions would
Id. at § 711(a).
Id. at § 713.
42 Id. at § 723. Currently, on average CFPB employees make “somewhat less than
a third-year investment banking analyst.” Matt Levine, Are Bank Regulators Overpaid?,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr. 22, 2014, 10:53 AM),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-22/are-bank-regulators-overpaid.
43 H.R. 10, § 724 (2017).
44 Id. at § 725.
45 Id. at § 731.
46 Id. at §717.
47 Id. at § 717.
48 Id. at § 717(4).
49 Id. at § 721.
50 Id. at § 718.
40
41
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require the expenditure of substantial resources on activities that do not directly benefit
victims of illegal practices or provide legal certainty to industry. Moreover, to ensure
these ongoing tasks occupy the CLEA’s staff time, the legislation also creates a new
independent inspector general’s office to police the agency. 51
Although the Choice Act appears to prioritize law enforcement, the bill would
erect a variety of procedural hurdles in the path of law enforcement investigations,
administrative actions, and federal litigation. For example, the Choice Act would give
the new OEA a gatekeeping role in all law enforcement matters. Under the new law,
the Agency would be required to conduct a specific cost-benefit study prior to initiating
any law enforcement case. 52 Moreover, the law appears to require a second, separate
cost-benefit analysis before resolving any disputed enforcement action with a consent
order. 53 And presumably, the Office of Enforcement within the CLEA would compete
for the OEA’s cost-benefit analysis resources with the slate of ongoing studies required
on all the agency’s existing regulations. The bill would also grant defendants in
administrative enforcement actions a right to compel the Agency to remove the case to
Federal court, thereby limiting the Agency’s tactical options. 54 The bill would also slow
down investigations by giving civil investigative demand respondents the right to
respond more slowly and to challenge the Agency’s right to collect information in
Federal court. 55 The Choice Act also eliminates the common pool of civil money
penalty funds that provides consumer relief to victims of insolvent defendants. 56
Currently, this pool provides thousands of victimized families compensation when the
businesses or individuals that hurt them are bankrupt or have hidden their assets. Under
the Choice Act, any excess civil money penalties would simply be handed over to
Congress while families victimized by insolvent defendants would receive no
compensation. 57
The Choice Act would also eliminate the CFPB’s supervisory authority. 58 Under
the Choice Act, the new CLEA would no longer conduct compliance audits of large
banks, mortgage brokers, credit reporting agencies, debt collectors, and other
businesses currently subject to CFPB supervision. The CFPB schedules its exams by
analyzing which businesses present the greatest risk of violating federal consumer
protection laws and causing harm to consumers. 59 Examiners are tasked with helping
the industry achieve consistent compliance standards for federal consumer financial
laws nationwide. 60 The Choice Act change would eliminate the CFPB’s largest office
Id. at § 714.
Id. at § 717.
53 Id. at § 717.
54 H.R. 10 at § 715.
55 Id. at § 716.
56 Id. at § 722. The Choice Act would return undistributed civil money penalties
to Congress, instead of providing relief to victims of illegal consumer protection law
violations. Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at § 712.
59 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Supervisory Highlights, Issue 1, at 3, Fall
2012. See also Jean Braucher & Angela Littwin, Examination as a Method of Consumer
Protection, 87 TEMPLE L. REV. 807, 837-40 (2015) (analyzing CFPB’s risk-based
supervisory policies).
60 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Supervisory Highlights, Issue 1, at 3, Fall
2012.
51
52
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that houses several hundred compliance examiners that travel the country conducting
compliance audits of supervised businesses. 61 Supervision is one of the key methods
through which the CFPB monitors and responds to spikes and trends in industry
problems. 62 Eliminating this supervisory oversight would take away the CFPB’s primary
method of resolving compliance problems outside of a public, adversarial enforcement
action context. Under the Choice Act, the new CLEA would not have access to
consumer finance business records unless it was prepared to sue to obtain those records
in Federal court. Instead, the Choice Act would return supervisory authority for
consumer protection to the banking regulations responsible for supervision prior to the
2008 financial crisis. And for non-bank companies such as debt collectors, credit
reporting agencies, and payday lenders, federal compliance exams would simply cease
to exist. Thus, while the legislation creates higher hurdles for bringing enforcement
cases, it also eliminates the agency’s most powerful non-adversarial tool for gathering
compliance information necessary to surmount those hurdles.
Substantively, the Choice Act also changes several consumer protection laws. The
most far reaching change is the repeal of the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of “unfair,
deceptive and abusive acts or practices.” 63 The CFPB’s law enforcement program has
focused more on deterring deception by consumer finance businesses than any other
regulatory requirement. 64 In the first five years of the CFPB’s enforcement program,
“[d]eception was, by far, the most commonly pleaded claim in CFPB matters.” 65 Cases
that included a deception claim produced over 90 percent of the consumer relief
provided to the American public. 66 Without the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of
unfair, deceptive and abusive practices, the new CLEA would not have a law within its
jurisdiction that would allow it to challenge even intentional lying by banks or other
financial service providers to their customers. As they did before the fiscal crisis,
prudential banking regulators would continue to have enforcement authority for unfair
and deceptive practices, 67 but—bizarrely—the new agency specifically tasked with
consumer law enforcement would not. 68
The Choice Act would also eliminate the CFPB’s regulatory and enforcement
authority over what is arguably the most controversial segment of the consumer finance
industry: short-term, high-interest lending. Specifically, the Choice Act would prohibit
61 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND
EXAMINATION MANUAL, at Overview 10-13 (March 2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_s
upervision-and-examination-manual.pdf (for an overview of the CFPB’s examination
process).
62 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Supervisory Highlights, Issue 15, at 25-26,
Spring 2017.
63 H.R. 10, § 735(a) (“The Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C.
5481 et seq.) is amended—
(1) in section 1021(b)(2), by striking ‘from unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and
practices …’”).
64 Peterson, CFPB Empirical Review, supra note 8, at 1095.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See Braucher & Littwin, supra note 59, at 821 (discussing the tension between
safety and soundness oversight and consumer protection at prudential banking
regulators).
68 H.R. 10, §§ 735-736.
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the new Consumer Law Enforcement Agency from enforcing the law “with respect to
payday loans, vehicle title loans, or other similar loans.” 69 Payday loans are illegal under
the laws of about a dozen states, carry average interest rates of around 400 percent, and
are often criticized by consumer advocates as predatory debt traps. 70 Others view
payday loans are a necessary tool for liquidity constrained consumers and believe
prohibition of the product would lead to unintended consequences. 71 The public
overwhelmingly supports usury limits that effectively ban the product. 72 The DoddFrank Act does not allow the CFPB to eliminate payday lending with an interest rate
limit, but it does prohibit payday lenders from using unfair, deceptive or abusive
marketing, underwriting, or collection tactics. 73 While the Federal Trade Commission
would continue to have jurisdiction over non-bank lenders, under the proposed Choice
Act the new Consumer Law Enforcement Agency would not have the authority to bring
an enforcement action against a payday lender that intentionally lies about its products
or services. The new CLEA would also be powerless to enforce enumerated federal
consumer protection laws including the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act
against payday lenders. Under the Choice Act payday lenders would receive the most
favorable, lightly regulated treatment of any consumer financial service provider in
America. Collectively, the constraints placed on the CFPB by the proposed Financial
Choice Act of 2017 would severely restrain actual law enforcement at the new consumer
law enforcement agency.
III. METHODS
This study identifies and classifies every public CFPB enforcement case from the
inception of the CFPB through the end of the 2016 calendar year. Public CFPB
enforcement actions were identified through the CFPB’s website, press releases, annual
reports to Congress, administrative adjudication docket, and searches of the Bureau’s
unsealed federal court pleadings. For each case, the CFPB has released some legal
69 Id. at § 733 (“The Agency may not exercise any rulemaking, enforcement, or
other authority with respect to payday loans, vehicle title loans, or other similar
loans.”).
70 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 PENN. L. REV. 101,
155–156 (2008); DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING
PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR
DEPENDENTS 39-46 (2006); Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lender” – A
Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 928
(2012) (hereinafter Warning: Predatory Lender).
71 THOMAS A. DURKIN, GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, MICHAEL E STATEN, & TODD
ZYWICKI, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 394-96 (2014); Victor
Stango, Are Payday Lending Markets Competitive?, REGULATION 26, 33 (Fall 2012)
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2012/11/v35n35.pdf; Todd Zywicki & Astrid Arca, The Case Against New Restrictions on Payday Lending,
64 MERCATUS ON POLICY 1, 2 (2009),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/MOP64_FMWG_Payday%20Lending_web.
pdf.
72 See Peterson, supra note 70, at 894.
73 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536 (explaining that covered persons providing
consumer financial products are prohibited from unfair, deceptive or abusive
practices).
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documentation of the enforcement matter. Typically, these documents include one or
more of the following: a notice of charges, a complaint, a consent order, a stipulation
consenting to issuance of a consent order, or a settlement agreement. For cases pursued
through the CFPB’s administrative enforcement procedures, the Bureau’s Office of
Administrative Adjudication (“OAA”) maintains a docket sheet that includes all
publicly available pleadings, motions, and orders. For cases in litigation, court filings
were accessed as necessary through the publicly available PACER system provided by
the U.S. judiciary.
For each of the CFPB’s public enforcement matters, these documents were
reviewed and coded using over 70 different variables. The data set analyzed in this
study updates and expands upon a data set compiled for a previous study reported in
the Tulane Law Review. 74 Coded variables included: the date the Bureau announced each
case; the date the case was resolved (if any); whether the case was filed as an
administrative enforcement matter or in U.S. district court; whether the case was settled
or contested upon announcement; whether the case involved a bank, credit union, or
some other non-depository company; whether the Bureau charged an individual
defendant with violating the law; and dollar amounts of total consumer redress and civil
money penalties awarded in all consent orders, final administrative orders, or judgments
imposed in every concluded matter. 75 This study also classifies every violation of law
the CFPB has asserted in public enforcement actions based on the statute providing
the legal authority for the claim. These classifications include all 18 enumerated statutes
set out in the Dodd-Frank Act, additional law that Congress subsequently added to the
Bureau’s enforcement jurisdiction, as well as the Bureau’s unfair, deceptive, and abusive
acts or practices (“UDAAP”) authorities. This study also classified the financial product
or service involved in each case based on the following categories: credit cards,
mortgage loans, student loans, automobile purchase loans, nonauto retail finance,
deposit accounts, remittances, pawn credit, payday loans (including similar small
installment loans and car title lending), medical debt, and payment processing services.
Furthermore, this study adds a new dimension to the debate of the Choice Act by
empirically testing a thought experiment: if the Choice Act had been controlling law
from 2012 to 2016, how would the CFPB’s law enforcement cases have changed? While
the Choice Act includes broad structural, procedural and substantive changes to the
CFPB and the laws it enforces, this thought experiment is limited to two substantive
legal changes: (1) the elimination of the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of unfair,
deceptive and abusive acts or practices and (2) the broad exemption for payday loans,
car title loans, and other similar forms of small dollar lending.
IV. RESULTS
This Part presents two categories of results: (1) results tracking the CFPB’s
enforcement track record through the 2016 calendar year and (2) results exploring the
consequences of the Financial Choice Act of 2017.

A. The CFPB’s Enforcement Track Record through 2016

74
75

Peterson, CFPB Empirical Review, supra note 8, at 1073-76.
Id.
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In 2016, the CFPB continued to maintain a brisk pace of enforcement actions with
a small decline in the number of announced actions in comparison to 2015. Figure 1
provides a graphic representation of the number of public law enforcement cases
announced by the CFPB juxtaposed with the number of CFPB employees by year.
From 2012 through 2014, the total number of CFPB employees grew steadily as did the
number of announced enforcement matters. The per-year number of cases peaked in
2015 with 55 announced matters. In 2016 the CFPB announced 42 new enforcement
matters.

Figure 1. Public CFPB enforcement cases and total
CFPB Employees, 2010-2016.
60
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Table 1 provides further context by listing the monetary value in consumer relief
and civil money penalties of public CFPB enforcement actions by year. These values
are further classified by whether the consumer relief and civil money penalties were
imposed upon banks, credit unions, or non-depository business. In 2016 the CFPB
imposed nearly $196 million in civil money penalties, an amount comparable to the
$205 million imposed in 2015. However, total consumer relief declined significantly
from $6.5 billion in 2015 to $292 million in 2016. Calendar year 2016 did see the first
CFPB public enforcement action against a credit union. The CFPB signed a consent
order with Navy Federal Credit Union providing $23 million in consumer relief and a
$5.5 million civil money penalty for misleading customers about its debt collection
practices and unlawfully restricting consumers’ access to their own funds. 76 Credit
Unions, only less than a half dozen of which meet the $10 billion asset threshold for
CFPB jurisdiction, have only paid about two-tenths of one percent of all consumer
relief. In comparison, through 2016 the CFPB has generated approximately $7.4 billion
in consumer relief from banks and about $4 billion in consumer relief from nondepository consumer financial services companies.

76 In re Navy Fed. Credit Union, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0024 (Oct. 11, 2016),
http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/102016_cfpb_NavyFederalConsentOrder.p
df.
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Table 1. Total consumer relief and civil money penalties in public CFPB
enforcement actions against banks, nonbanks, and credit unions, 2012-2016.
banks
2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

nonbanks
total
banks
nonbanks
total
banks
nonbanks
total
banks
nonbanks
total
banks
nonbanks
credit unions
total
banks
nonbanks
credit unions
total

Total consumer relief
$
%
425,000,000
100.0
100,000
425,100,000
485,800,000
50,539,465
536,339,465
1,065,300,000
2,784,071,234
3,849,371,234
5,385,059,808
1,042,537,401
6,427,597,209
88,030,035
181,437,672
23,000,000
292,467,707
7,449,189,843
4,058,685,772
23,000,000
11,530,875,614

0.0
100.0
90.6
9.4
100.0
27.7
72.3
100.0
83.8
16.2
100.0
30.1
62.0
7.9
100.0
64.6
35.2
0.2
100.0

Civil money penalties
$
%
46,100,000
100.0
5,000
46,105,000
47,634,000
27,366,002
75,000,002
38,700,000
23,736,076
62,436,076
109,500,000
95,229,004
204,729,004
124,130,756
66,104,001
5,500,000
195,734,757
366,064,756
212,440,083
5,500,000
584,004,839

0.0
100.0
63.5
36.5
100.0
62.0
38.0
100.0
53.5
46.5
100.0
63.4
33.8
2.8
100.0
62.7
36.4
0.9
100.0

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions 2012-2016.

Table 2 shows trends in the settlement of CFPB cases alongside the CFPB’s
decision to charge an individual defendant in each enforcement action. With respect to
the former, in 17 out of 42 enforcement actions announced in 2016, at least one
defendant had not reached a settlement agreement with the Bureau. With about 40
percent of cases contested, 2016 saw a significant uptick in the proportion of cases
where the CFPB had not concluded a settlement agreement at the time it announced
each action. Nevertheless, nine of the 17 contested cases were relatively minor disputes
that the CFPB brought as part of two “sweeps.” The first was a sweep of car title lenders
in Arizona that were violating the Truth in Lending Act’s restriction on advertising
interest rates in a format other than an annual percentage rate. 77 All of the cases were
settled shortly after announcement with consent to a relatively modest civil money
penalty. The second sweep focused on several pawnshops in Virginia that were

15 U.S.C. § 1664(c); Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Sues Five Arizona Title
Lenders for Failing to Disclose Loan Annual Percentage Rate to Consumers
(September 21, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-sues-five-arizona-title-lenders-failing-disclose-loan-annualpercentage-rate-consumers/.
77
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providing consumers with inaccurate TILA price disclosures. 78 Like the Arizona sweep,
each case resolved quickly with a civil money penalty. Placing these matters to the side,
the eight remaining contested cases reflect a level of settlement comparable to prior
years.
The rate at which the CFPB charged at least one individual person in public
enforcement actions declined slightly in 2016. In prior years, the CFPB included charges
against at least one individual person in between 25 and 37 percent of cases. In 2016, 9
out of 42 enforcement cases included charges against an individual person reflecting a
rate of about 21 percent. Whether the Bureau charges individuals in public enforcement
actions is important, because a key lesson of the financial crisis was the importance of
holding individual employees accountable for corporate wrongdoing. 79 On the other
hand, charging individual defendants decreases the likelihood of achieving a settlement
and increases the resources the Bureau must dedicate to each matter. Overall the Bureau
has charged an individual defendant in 28 percent of its public enforcement cases.

Table 2. Settlement, individual accountability, and deception in
public CFPB enforcement actions by year, 2012-2016.
Cases contested at
Cases w/
filing
individual charged
n
n
%
n
%
8
2
25.0
3
37.5
2012
27
6
22.2
8
29.6
2013
2014
32
11
34.4
12
37.5
2015
55
10
18.2
14
25.5
2016
42
17
40.5
9
21.4
total
164
46
28.0
46
28.0
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 20122016.
All cases

In the years following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the legal theory that
generated the most discussion and controversy was the prohibition of “abusive”
practices, an addition to the longer-standing restrictions on deceptive and unfair
conduct. Some have expressed concern that a general prohibition of abusive practices
would allow the CFPB to use an ‘I know it when I see it’ approach to enforcement that
15 U.S.C. § 1607(a)(6); Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Takes Action Against
Pawn Companies for Deceiving Consumers About Loan Costs (December 19, 2016),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-againstpawn-companies-deceiving-consumers-about-loan-costs/.
79. U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 6, at xix. See also Emily
Stephenson, U.S. Consumer Watchdog Says Committed to Stiff Penalties, REUTERS (Oct. 23,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-washington-summit-cordrayidUSBRE99M1K520131023 (statement of Richard Cordray) (“I’ve always felt strongly
that you can’t only go after companies. Companies run through individuals, and
individuals need to know that they’re at risk when they do bad things under the umbrella
of a company.”).
78
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could lead to abuse of government power. 80 Table 3 provides an interesting contrast
between CFPB cases that included deceptive practices claims and cases that included
abusive practices claims. In every year of the CFPB’s existence the number and size of
cases attacking false or misleading claims far outstrips those cases challenging abusive
practices. Reflecting trends of previous years, in 2016 a majority of all CFPB cases (23
out of 42) included at least one claim challenging false or misleading material statements
made by a bank, credit union, or financial service provider. Moreover, the largest CFPB
cases as measured by relief provided to American consumers have overwhelmingly
included claims attacking deceptive practices. In the history of the CFPB, over 93
percent of all consumer relief was awarded in cases where the business deceived its
customers about a material fact. In contrast, the CFPB has accused businesses of
engaging in abusive practices relatively infrequently and only in relatively small cases.
Overall, consumer relief in cases alleging abusive practices constituted only around 1
percent of all consumer relief awarded in CFPB enforcement actions. Indeed, these
data suggest that above all else, the CFPB’s enforcement program has focused on
promoting truthfulness in consumer finance.
Table 3. Deceptive practices vs. abusive practices in public CFPB
enforcement cases, 2012-2016.
Cases pleading deceptive practices

Cases pleading abusive practices

%

n

%

87.5

consumer relief $
x 1000*
437,058.0

97.44

0

44.4
56.3
67.3
54.8
59.1

2,372,481.7
2,154,125.0
5,784,886.5
127,379.2
10,875,930.4

84.56
94.74
96.58
79.98
93.14

2
5
8
7
22

n

%

2012

7

2013
2014
2015
2016
total

12
18
37
23
97

0.0

consumer relief $
x 1000*
.0

0.00

7.4
15.6
14.5
16.7
13.4

499.2
99,529.1
20,778.0
3,103.1
123,909.5

0.02
4.38
0.35
1.95
1.06

%

*Total consumer relief figures reflect awards generated in cases that included each type of
enumerated statutory claim. However, monetary awards may be attributable to multiple violations
of different laws asserted in each case. Year of award calculations are based on the date first filing
in each case and include cases first announced by December 31, 2016 with final consumer relief
awarded prior to July 1, 2017. Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions,
2012-2016.

B. Understanding the Financial Choice Act of 2017 through the Lens of
Past CFPB Enforcement Actions
The CFPB’s track record of focusing on correcting deceptive financial practices
contrasts sharply with the proposed Financial Choice Act of 2017. Table 4 presents
data on how sections 733, 734, and 735 of the Choice Act would have affected the
CFPB’s enforcement track record if these sections had been controlling law at the time
Reginald R. Goeke, Is the CFPB Torturing Language with Its Abusive Standard?,
LAW360 (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/621386/is-thecfpb-torturing-language-with-its-abusive-standard-?article_related_content=1 (“This
‘I know it when I see it’ approach naturally grants the CFPB the maximum flexibility
to bring enforcement actions, while granting industry participants the minimum level
of notice about what is required of them.”).
80
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of each case. Section 733 would eliminate regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction over
payday loans, car title loans, and other similar forms of small dollar credit. 81 Section 734
would repeal the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of deceptive, unfair, and abusive
consumer finance. 82 Looking back at CFPB enforcement actions, those cases that only
pleaded UDAAP claims would not have been possible if section 734 of the Choice Act
were in effect. Similarly, every CFPB case involving payday or automobile title lending
would have been untenable if section 733 were controlling law. The effect of these two
changes is tallied for a selected list of product or service types in Table 4. Notably, 13
of the CFPB’s 52 mortgage cases only included UDAAP charges and therefore would
have been eliminated. Forty-one percent of debt collection cases would have been
eliminated and 63 percent of credit card cases would have been impossible. And of
course, all 24 of the CFPB’s payday lending related cases would have been unviable if
section 733 of the Choice Act had been controlling law at the time of each case. Indeed,
a large proportion of the CFPB’s cases in virtually every type of financial product or
service would have been impossible if the Choice Act had been in effect from 2012 to
2016.
Nevertheless, focusing on eliminated cases actually understates the effect the
Choice Act would have had upon the CFPB’s track record. In addition to eliminated
cases, the right-hand columns in table 4 adds those cases that would have been seriously
weakened by the Choice Act for one or more of three reasons. First the right-hand
columns include those cases where at least one UDAAP claim would have been
eliminated under section 733 but one or more claims under an enumerated statute
would have remained. Many CFPB cases include both UDAAP claims as well as one
or more causes of action arising out of an enumerated statute such as the Truth in
Lending Act or the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. However, violations that sound
in UDAAP law are often more serious and associated with more consumer harm than
what are sometimes technical violations of enumerated statutes. The elimination of
UDAAP jurisdiction would seriously weaken these enforcement actions. Second, the
right-hand columns include cases some courts might have considered to be beyond
CFPB jurisdiction because they involved a form of small dollar credit similar to payday
loans. While section 733 of the Choice Act provides an exemption to “payday loans,
vehicle title loans, or other similar loans,” the Act does not provide guidance on what
types of credit are “similar” to payday loans. Arguably, defendants in pawn shop cases
and some forms of installment lending cases could claim they too qualify for the Choice
Act’s small dollar lending exemption. These cases would have been severely weakened
by the Choice Act because the CFPBs jurisdiction to would have been unclear. And
third, the right-hand columns also add cases that included Equal Credit Opportunity
Act claims, which would have been undermined by repeal of the CFPB’s guidance on
racial discrimination in automobile finance in section 735 of the Choice Act. 83 With an
explicit rebuke from Congress, the authority of the CFPB to challenge auto finance
company kick-backs to car dealers in exchange for delivering above par interest rate
loans to Black and Latino borrowers would have been much less certain.
With the notable exception of mortgage lending cases arising under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, 84 the combined effect of sections 733, 734 and 735 of the
H.R. 10 § 733 (2017).
H.R. 10 § 734 (2017).
83 Id. at § 735.
84 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat.
1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 27).
81
82
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Choice Act would have been to eliminate or severely weaken almost every CFPB
enforcement case. If the Choice Act had been in effect, every single CFPB enforcement
action involving credit cards, payday loans, ancillary “add-on” products, debt relief
services, automobile financing, student loans, payment processing, checking or savings
accounts, and pawnshops would have either been eliminated or substantially weakened.
The Choice Act would also have eliminated or seriously weakened 38 out of 39 debt
collection cases and four out of five retail finance cases.
Table 4. CFPB Enforcement Actions from 2012-2016 that would have been
eliminated or weakened under the Financial Choice Act of 2017 by affected
financial product or service.
Financial product
or service

Actual
CFPB
cases

Cases eliminated

Cases eliminated or
seriously weakened

n

%

n

%

Mortgages
Debt collection
Credit cards

52

13

25.0%

22

42.3%

39
27

16
17

41.0%
63.0%

38
27

97.4%
100.0%

Payday/auto title

24

24

100.0%

24

100.0%

Ancillary products

18

13

72.2%

18

100.0%

Debt relief services

16

12

75.0%

16

100.0%

Auto finance
Student loans

12

3

25.0%

12

100.0%

10

3

30.0%

10

100.0%

Payment processing

9

8

88.9%

9

100.0%

Deposit accounts

6

3

50.0%

6

100.0%

Retail finance
Pawn loans

5

2

40.0%

4

80.0%

5

0

0.0%

5

100.0%

Remittances

0

0

n/a

0

n/a

Source: Analysis of Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10 §§ 733, 734, 735 in relation to public CFPB
Enforcement Actions, 2012-2016.

Placing to the side those cases that the Choice Act merely would have weakened,
the Choice Act would have entirely eliminated those CFPB cases that provided the vast
majority of actual relief to American consumers. Table 5 tallies the consumer
restitution, forgiven debts, and other direct consumer relief provided to the American
public in CFPB cases that either exclusively pleaded UDAAP claims or involved payday
lending. While the Choice Act would not have explicitly prohibited 75 percent of the
CFPB’s mortgage lending cases, the 25 percent of those cases that would have been
eliminated generated 91.5 percent of the relief provided to consumers. Similarly, the
41% of debt collection cases eliminated by the Choice Act accounted for 87% of the
relief provided to the public. Furthermore, the seventeen eliminated credit card cases
were responsible for providing $6.7 billion in relief to consumers, accounting for 94
percent of the compensation to the public for illegal practices associated with that type
of product. Across every type of financial service, the Choice Act’s elimination of
UDAAP claims—especially those claims attacking deceptive practices—would have
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protected those consumer finance businesses that the CFPB found to have caused the
most harm to the largest number of Americans.
Table 5. Consumer Relief in 2012-2016 public CFPB enforcement
actions that would have been eliminated under the Financial
Choice Act of 2017 by affected financial product or service.
Financial product
or service

Consumer relief
in actual CFPB
cases

Effect of cases eliminated by
the Choice Act
Eliminated
consumer relief

%
change

$2,960,370,784

-$2,709,055,737

-91.5%

$6,791,303,658
$7,170,024,170

-$5,935,777,783
-$6,763,754,170

-87.4%
-94.3%

Payday/auto title

$73,235,927

-$73,235,927

-100.0%

Ancillary products

$2,453,511,025

-$2,165,111,025

-88.2%

Debt relief services

$298,590,242

-$257,375,522

-86.2%

Auto finance
Student loans

$197,487,783

-$49,687,783

-25.2%

$525,480,184

-$23,870,184

-4.5%

Payment processing

$144,164,150

-$144,164,150

-100.0%

Deposit accounts

$88,303,145

-$36,403,145

-41.2%

Retail finance
Pawn loans

$95,579,124

-$1,050,000

-1.1%

$0

$0

n/a

Remittances

$0

$0

n/a

Mortgages
Debt collection
Credit cards

Source: Analysis of Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10 §§ 733, 735 in relation to
Public CFPB Enforcement Actions, 2012-2016.This table attributes awarded consumer
relief to multiple product or service classifications for cases relating to more than one
type of product or service and includes cases announced by December 31, 2016 with final
consumer relief awarded prior to July 1, 2017.

Similarly, Table 6 shows the effect the proposed elimination of UDAAP
authority and payday lending jurisdiction would have had on civil money penalties
imposed by the CFPB from 2012 to 2016. Similar to the effect of the Choice Act
upon consumer relief, had the proposed legislation been in effect, it would have vastly
reduced the fines the CFPB imposed on companies that engaged in unfair, deceptive,
or abusive practices. For example, those cases accounting for nearly 95 percent of the
civil money penalties imposed by the CFPB relating to credit cards would have been
eliminated. Moreover, the Choice Act would have wiped out all of the fines related to
payment processing and deposit accounts. Most notably, in 2016 the CFPB imposed a
$100 million fine on Wells Fargo for fraudulently creating over two million fake,
unauthorized bank accounts in the names of its customers. The CFPB challenged this
practice using the UDAAP authority that the Choice Act proposes to eliminate.
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Table 6. Civil Money Penalties in 2012-2016 CFPB Enforcement
Actions that Would Have Been Eliminated Under the Financial
Choice Act of 2017 by Effected Financial Product or Service.
Financial product
or service

CMPs in
actual
CFPB cases

Mortgages
Debt collection
Credit cards
Payday/auto title
Ancillary products
Debt relief services
Auto finance
Student loans
Payment processing

$124,197,759
$173,980,000
$280,700,000
$28,942,000
$133,250,000
$134,336,003
$40,465,000
$14,175,002
$12,476,000

Deposit accounts
Retail finance
Pawn loans
Remittances

$130,700,000
$350,001
$27,500
$0

Effect of cases eliminated
by the Choice Act
Eliminated
CMPs
-$16,213,001
-$100,750,000
-$266,100,000
-$28,942,000
-$124,150,000
-$112,421,002
-$5,250,000
-$8,025,001
-$12,476,000

%
change
-13.1%
-57.9%
-94.8%
-100.0%
-93.2%
-83.7%
-13.0%
-56.6%
-100.0%

-$113,000,000

-86.5%

-$50,000
$0
$0

-14.3%
0.0%
n/a

Source: Analysis of Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10 §§ 733 and735 in relation to
public CFPB Enforcement Actions, 2012-2016. This table attributes awarded civil
money penalties to multiple product or service classifications for cases relating to more
than one type of product or service and includes cases announced by December 31,
2016 with final consumer relief awarded prior to July 1, 2017.

V. CONCLUSION
The Financial Choice Act of 2017 is appropriately named in at least one sense: its
proposed restrictions on the authority of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
reflect a choice by the House of Representatives to protect financial companies at the
expense of consumers. This choice is borne out by the data. As this empirical review of
CFPB enforcement cases demonstrates, nearly all of the relief provided to American
consumers in CFPB enforcement cases arose where a bank, credit union, or other
finance company deceived their customers about a material aspect of their product or
service. Between 2012 and 2016, the CFPB’s enforcement efforts generated $10.5
billion in consumer relief –accounting for 93 percent of all compensation—in cases that
included a deceptive-practices claim. Had the Choice Act been in effect, the CFPB
would have been powerless to stop the deception of American consumers by financial
corporations within its jurisdiction. This change alone would have eliminated or
seriously weakened the vast majority of CFPB cases. Moreover, the Choice Act’s
blanket exemption on law enforcement cases involving payday loans and similar forms
of credit would have eliminated at least 24 enforcement cases where the CFPB found
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payday or vehicle title lenders breaking the law, generating $73 million in consumer
relief and $28 million dollars in civil money penalties. Between the Choice Act’s
elimination of UDAAP claims and its proposed exemption for payday lenders, had the
Act been in effect from 2012 to 2016, many consumers would have lost out on billions
of dollars of relief, and even more would have fallen prey to unchecked violations of
numerous consumer protection laws. This empirical comparison of the proposed
Choice Act’s provisions to the CFPB’s law enforcement track record leaves little doubt
that if the bill passes, meaningful consumer law enforcement will grind to a halt within
the rebranded Consumer Law Enforcement Agency. Indeed, the Choice Act’s renaming
of the CFPB as the Consumer Law Enforcement Agency is ironic and misleading. The
Choice Act makes a stark and unapologetic choice favoring corporate wrongdoing and
lawlessness over consumers
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